
Based upon a presentation made to "Fathers Are Capable Too"
on Tuesday, 1 May 2001
[IMPORTANT NOTE JUNE 23, 2004: Later in this paper, I will discuss the Miglin case from the Ontario Court of Appeal. The decision in Miglin was overturned on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada in 2003. In 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in Hartshorne. The cumulative effect of both decisions (Miglin re spousal support in the context of separation agreements and Hartshorne re property settlements in the context of marriage contracts) is to give much more primacy to the importance of a written agreement, freely negotiated between the two sides.]
Since the 1993 Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) decision in Moge v. Moge, we have seen an ever-increasing climate where the economic realities of separation and divorce appear to be disregarded. The issue of spousal support has become riddled with the politics of political correctness, that is - feminist political correctness. While the feminist movement has done much to rectify historical inequalities between the genders, the discourse has now escalated. The economic interests of the now reconstructed family unit have been sacrificed in favour of a wealth transfer from men to women. This may favour women in the short run but it surely will result in harm to children overall and contribute to the ever increasing alienation of men. "Wealth transfer" really is not a proper term for it implies that men are generally rich and women are generally poor and this is not always the reality. Rather, separation and divorce tends to impoverish all concerned to varying degrees. Family law assumes that women are the ones who are impoverished. Judges are seeking to rectify this state of affairs. The result is that the courts have often moved away from doing equity and fairness in the individual case in favour of righting the perceived wrongs of society in general. The net result is that it is very difficult to be a man and expect to be treated in an entirely evenhanded manner by the courts when it comes to an issue such as spousal support.
It is not that judges are bad and are trying to be unfair to men. Most of the judges I know are very decent, dedicated and hard working individuals and would undoubtedly see themselves as dispensing justice in a fair and equitable manner. I suggest that the problems we face now in family law are the result of two very significant social trends: 1. The legal education system is decidedly feminist in approach. Many judges are simply products of that system. 2. Society is permeated with myths and stereotypes about men and the effects of separation and divorce. The decisions that judges make are simply are a reflection of those myths and stereotypes. The advice that lawyers give are likewise based upon the myths and stereotypes and how those values are likely to be reflected in court decisions.
This paper is not going to focus on those myths and stereotypes although an appreciation of that issue would help us to understand why the law of spousal support is developing the way it is. Rather, I am going to attempt to provide you with an understanding of the main principles of spousal support since 1993, how those developments affect men, how those developments affect the freedom to privately contract into or out of the spousal support obligation, and what steps I feel men need to take in order to bring some balance and sanity back into family law. I will be referring to a number of cases that have been decided recently; by the conclusion of this talk you will all be experts in the law of spousal support!
I believe that the Ontario Court of Appeal has recently confirmed, in the case of Miglin v. Miglin, what other cases have been telling us lately – the law has all but taken away the freedom to privately contract with respect to rights and responsibilities relating to spousal support. This spells the death knell of marriage contracts, cohabitation agreements and separation agreements, at least as they apply to spousal support.
Consider the situation where there is a first application for support under Divorce Act (examine statutory provisions): [Click here for a reproduction of the main provisions addressing the issue of spousal support]
Is there a way to prevent a spousal support order from being granted?
Consider where one side wants to change the order later.
Factual frameworks that have found their way to S.C.C. are not particularly helpful for spouses who are the ones that have to pay. (An aside: That is why constitutional challenges that I have heard about are ill advised. You need a good factual framework if you want the court to expound general principles that will help all support payors.)
56 That Parliament could not have meant to institutionalize the ethos of deemed self-sufficiency is also apparent from an examination of the social context in which support orders are made. In Canada, the feminization of poverty is an entrenched social phenomenon. Between 1971 and 1986 the percentage of poor women found among all women in this country more than doubled. During the same period the percentage of poor among all men climbed by 24 per cent. The results were such that by 1986, 16 per cent of all women in this country were considered poor: M. Gunderson, L. Muszynski and J. Keck, Women and Labour Market Poverty (1990), at p. 8.
57 Given the multiplicity of economic barriers women face in society, decline into poverty cannot be attributed entirely to the financial burdens arising from the dissolution of marriage: J.D. Payne, "The Dichotomy between Family Law and Family Crises on Marriage Breakdown" (1989), 20 R.G.D. 109, at pp. 116–17. However, there is no doubt that divorce and its economic effects are playing a role. Several years ago, L.J. Weitzman released her landmark study on divorce, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America (1985), and concluded at p. 323:
For most women and children, divorce means precipitous downward mobility — both economically and socially. The reduction in income brings residential moves and inferior housing, drastically diminished or nonexistent funds for recreation and leisure, and intense pressures due to inadequate time and money. Financial hardships in turn cause social dislocation and a loss of familiar networks for emotional support and social services, and intensify the psychological stress for women and children alike. On a societal level, divorce increases female and child poverty and creates an ever-widening gap between the economic well-being of divorced men, on the one hand, and their children and former wives on the other.
(See also J.B. McLindon, "Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and Children" (1987), 21 Fam. L.Q. 351.)
58 The picture in Canada seems to follow a similar pattern. In the federal Department of Justice (Bureau of Review), Evaluation of the Divorce Act — Phase II: Monitoring and Evaluation (1990), it was found, based on client interviews that, following divorce, 59 per cent of women and children surveyed fell below the poverty line, a figure that dropped to 46 per cent when support was included in the calculation of their incomes (see pp. 92–93). However, a more realistic picture, as it is not restricted to the more affluent segment of the divorcing public, is probably revealed by an analysis of court files, which determined that in 1988, overall two-thirds of divorced women had total incomes which placed them below the poverty line. When support was excluded, 74 per cent of divorced women fell below the poverty line (see pp. 94–95). It is apparent that support payments, even assuming they are paid, are making only a marginal contribution to reducing economic hardship among women following divorce. In contrast, a previous study released in 1986, Evaluation of the Divorce Act — Phase I: Monitoring and Evaluation, found that only 10 per cent of men were below the poverty line after paying support, and the average income was $13,500 above the poverty line in such one-person households after the payment of support.
59 Other studies confirm the trend. According to Statistics Canada, "Alimony and child support," in Perspectives on Labour and Income (Summer 1992), p. 8, at p. 18, the per capita income of those paying support in 1988 was $25,800 while the per capita income of those receiving it in the same year was $10,500.
60 An examination of the economic position of single mothers is also useful in assessing the effects of dissolution of marriage since about 30 per cent of single mothers are divorced: Statistics Canada, Women in Canada: A Statistical Report, 2nd ed. (1990), at p. 16. In 1987, 57 per cent of single mothers lived below the poverty line: National Council of Welfare, Women and Poverty Revisited (1990), at p. 58. Gunderson, Muszynski and Keck report a figure of 44.1 per cent in 1986 (p. 18). (See also Statistics Canada, "Work and Relative Poverty," in Perspectives on Labour and Income (Summer 1990), p. 32).
61 Reports such as these have led many Canadian commentators to draw direct links between female poverty and the financial consequences of the dissolution of marriage. While M. Eichler emphasizes the limits of family law in addressing poverty in "The Limits of Family Law Reform or, The Privatization of Female and Child Poverty" (1990–91), 7 C.F.L.Q. 59, she recognizes that family law nevertheless has a role to play in alleviating poverty for single mothers when she writes at p. 60:
What are the consequences of divorce for women, men and children, besides emotional pain? They are very different. Men tend to maintain the standard of living they had before the divorce, while women and children sink into instant poverty.
(See also E.D. Pask and M.L. McCall, "How Much and Why? An Overview" (1989), 5 C.F.L.Q. 129, at pp. 139–40.)
62 Findings in the Report of the Social Assistance Review Committee, Transitions (1988), show that support can be a significant factor in alleviating some of these negative economic effects. The report notes that recipients of social assistance who receive support payments are more likely to leave the programme than those who do not and that the length of time a recipient receives social assistance is inversely proportional to the total amount of support received. At p. 44, the report states:
The nearly 50% of single parents receiving [family benefit allowance] who receive no support payments at all averaged between 3.5 and 4 years in the program. The 11% receiving between $10 and $100 per month averaged 2.5 to 3 years, while those receiving between $100 and $200 per month averaged 2 to 2.5 years. Finally, the mere 6% receiving in excess of $200 per month averaged less than 2 years in the program.
These socio-economic observations in my view support the objectives set out in the Act in as much as they provide background information useful in determining the intent of the legislators should that intent ever be in doubt.
63 As Lamer C.J.C. stated in R. v. Multiform Manufacturing Co., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 624, 113 N.R. 373, 32 Q.A.C. 241, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 290, 58 C.C.C. (3d) 257, 79 C.R. (3d) 390, at p. 630 [S.C.R.], "when the courts are called upon to interpret a statute, their task is to discover the intention of Parliament." It is also axiomatic of statutory interpretation that Parliament must be taken as being aware of the social and historical context in which it makes its intention known: P.-A. Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 2nd ed. (1992), at p. 346.
64 It would be perverse in the extreme to assume that Parliament's intention in enacting the Act was to financially penalize women in this country. And, while it would undeniably be simplistic to identify the deemed self-sufficiency model of spousal support as the sole cause of the female decline into poverty, based on the review of the jurisprudence and statistical data set out in these reasons, it is clear that the model has disenfranchised many women in the courtroom and countless others who may simply have decided not to request support in anticipation of their remote chances of success. The theory, therefore, at a minimum, is contributing to the problem. I am in agreement with Professor Baily, at p. 633 that:
The test is being applied to create a clean break between the spouses before the conditions of self-sufficiency for the dependent partner have been met, and will undoubtedly cause an increase in the widespread poverty (at least relative poverty) of women and children of failed unions ... [emphasis added]
65 In the result, I am respectfully of the view that the support model of self-sufficiency which Mr. Moge urges the court to apply, cannot be supported as a matter of statutory interpretation, considering in particular the diversity of objectives set out in the Act.
92 Based upon the studies which I have cited earlier in these reasons, the general economic impact of divorce on women is a phenomenon the existence of which cannot reasonably be questioned and should be amenable to judicial notice. More extensive social science data are also appearing. Such studies are beginning to provide reasonable assessments of some of the disadvantages incurred and advantages conferred post-divorce (see, for example, the study by Kerr). While qualification will remain difficult and fact related in each particular case, judicial notice should be taken of such studies, subject to other expert evidence which may bear on them, as background information at the very least. In the face of these complex evidentiary problems, I take comfort from Professor Ellman who argues at pp. 99–100 that:
Even crude approximations of theoretically defensible criteria are probably better than intuitive estimates of what is "fair" under a system lacking established principles of "fairness" in the first place. Moreover, the establishment of rules clearly specifying the facts that are relevant in judging alimony claims, and the precise impact of these facts on the amount of the claim, may itself motivate studies that increase the amount of relevant data. In the end, precision is not obtainable. The determination of alimony claims, even more than most legal questions, will necessarily depend, at least in part, upon the rough justice of trial judge discretion. That is, in fact, one of the lessons of this inquiry. But we are still better off knowing what we should be doing, even if we cannot do it perfectly, than not knowing it at all. [emphasis added; footnotes omitted]
75 The equitable sharing of the economic consequences of marriage or marriage breakdown, however, is not a general tool of redistribution which is activated by the mere fact of marriage. Nor ought it to be. It is now uncontentious in our law and accepted by both the majority and the minority in Messier v. Delage, supra, at pp. 416–17, that marriage per se does not automatically entitle a spouse to support. Presumably, there will be the occasional marriage where both spouses maximize their earning potential by working outside the home, pursuing economic and educational opportunities in a similar manner, dividing up the domestic labour identically, and either making no economic sacrifices for the other or, more likely, making them equally. In such a utopian scenario there might be no apparent call for compensation. The spouses are able to make a clean break and continue on with their respective lives. Such cases would appear to be rare. In most marriages in which both partners make economic sacrifices and share domestic responsibilities, or where one spouse has suffered economic losses in order to enable the other spouse to further a career, their roles should be considered in the spousal support order.
77 As economic consequences have to be shared in an equitable manner by both partners, it is my view that the Act, while envisaging compensation for the economic advantages and disadvantages of marriage or marriage breakdown, does not necessarily put the entire burden of such compensation on the shoulders of only one party. I stress here that in the discussion of spousal support one must not lose sight of the fact that the real dilemma in most cases relates to the ability to pay of the debtor spouse and the limits of support orders in achieving fair compensation and alleviating the economic burdens of the disadvantaged spouse. While the disadvantages of the kind I mention hereunder are compensable, though not necessarily automatically or fully compensated in every case, the ultimate goal is to alleviate the disadvantaged spouse's economic losses as completely as possible, taking into account all the circumstances of the parties, including the advantages conferred on the other spouse during the marriage.
13 Is a sick or disabled spouse entitled to spousal support when a marriage ends, and if so, when and how much? More precisely, may a spouse have an obligation to support a former spouse over and above what is required to compensate the spouse for loss incurred as a result of the marriage and its breakdown (or to fulfill contractual support agreements)? I would answer this question in the affirmative.